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Abstract: With the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, the application of robots is widening and deepening. Due to the fact that robots are capable of 
machine learning and deep learning, we establish a theoretical model of the production process by considering the difference in learning ability between robots and labor 
forces, namely the difference in "learning by doing" ability. Based on this, the influence of robots on long-term economic growth is investigated. Our analytical results show 
that when the learning ability of robots is stronger than human capital, there will be no balanced growth path for the economy, and the economy will eventually show a 
sustained growth pattern, and the growth rate of capital per capita, output per capita and robot per capita will keep growing. However, more robots are not always better. 
There is an optimal robot investment ratio to maximize the long-term growth rate of output per capita. Managers should not only increase investments in robots. How to 
improve the learning ability of robots is also of great importance. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, with the rapid development of artificial 
intelligence (AI) technology, a new round of scientific and 
technological revolution and industrial transformation is 
gradually taking shape. This cutting-edge technology is 
integrated with other ones, e.g., big data, machine learning, 
and robot technology, and reshaped the economic activities 
to a larger extent than ever before. Numerous industrial 
practices have witnessed the penetration of AI and robot 
technologies into our daily life, reshaping the landscape of 
business eco-systems. For instance, on October 27, 
2017, according to a report by CNBC [33], the retail 
giant Wal-Mart has deployed shelf-scanning robots in 50 
locations in the United States, which are mainly 
used to check inventory, prices, and misplaced items.  
The worldwide robot market is developing and 
expanding rapidly, and countries around the world are 
utilizing more and more robots. According to a report from 
the international federation of robotics (IFR), the volumes 
of robots are growing at a rate of about 6 percent per year 
globally. According to IFR’s 2016 robot report, the global 
demand for robots is projected to grow at a rate of 12 
percent per year between 2016 and 2019. With the 
increasing employments of robots and the continuous 
development of the world robot market, this new 
innovation will inevitably have a profound impact on 
economic growth.  
There are some advantages and disadvantages of the 
robot investment. There are ample real-life examples and 
literature emphasizing the positive effects of robots on 
short-term economic growth. Existing empirical studies 
support the point that the use of industrial robots can 
increase labor productivity [1-6]. Prettner [7] believes that 
the use of robots can indeed promote the economy, and 
even in some cases, the economy can achieve permanent 
growth even without technological progress.  
However, there is still no consensus on whether the 
application of robots will boost economic growth in the 
long run. Some literature suggests that the substitution 
effects of robots will inhibit the growth of employment and 
wages, thus prohibiting the increase of investment, leading 
to the reduction of the welfare of young workers and their 
children and grandchildren [8-10].  
Perhaps one day in the future, as AI technology and 
machine learning capabilities continue to improve, as long 
as the intelligence of robots can surpass the general 
intelligence of human beings, robots will not simply exist 
as a replacement of labor, which will completely change 
the economic development landscape of our society. 
Nowadays, we still lack systematic thinking and rational 
expectations of this emerging thing. 
Motivated by the aforementioned industrial practice 
and existing works, we are trying to address the following 
research questions: 
(1) What are the impacts of robots on the output and 
the return gap under the perfect competition conditions? 
(2) What are the impacts of robots on the long-term 
economic growth rate? Will the use of robots lead the 
economy to sustained growth? 
(3) What factors will influence the long-term 
economic growth rate? Is there an optimal robot investment 
ratio to maximize the long-term growth rate of output per 
capita? 
To address these research questions aforementioned, 
we establish a theoretical model of long-term economic 
growth incorporating the learning ability of robots different 
from labor force. We then explore the influence of robots 
on long-term economic growth.   
We make contributions to the existing literature in 
several-folds. First, although several prior pieces of 
research [10-12] discuss the impacts of the robot for the 
labor market and economic development, most of them 
simply regard the robots as a substitute during the 
production process. Most of these studies have not 
considered the characteristics of robots in their model. In 
this paper, we take into account the difference in learning 
ability between robots and labor forces in the production 
process, namely the difference in "learning by doing" 
ability. Second, we show that the long-term sustained 
economic growth is achievable if robots are capable of 
machine learning abilities, which makes robots smarter 
than human labor. Third, we provide the factors which 
influence the long-term economic growth rate.  
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 summarizes the existing literature on robots and 
economic growth. In Section 3, we build up a theoretical 
model to investigate the economic growth considering 
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robots with machine learning ability. After considering the 
machine learning ability of robots, the endogenous growth 
model based on the concepts of "learning by doing" is 
established for the long-term equilibrium analysis. To 
illustrate our theoretical results in a more intuitive way, a 
numerical study is provided in Section 4. We summarize 
and conclude in the last section of this paper. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section, we review the existing literature which 
relates to us the most. First, we review the work which 
projects the impacts of technical progress on economic 
growth. Second, we summarize the prior literature showing 
the impacts of robots regarding economic growth. 
In terms of research on the economic influences of 
technological development, the development of 
information and communication technology has increased 
labor productivity, which is supported by some empirical 
studies [13-15]. There is also some literature about how to 
make full use of information technology to improve the 
efficiency of firms’ operations [16, 17]. However, Gordon 
[18] expressed a pessimistic view that the real GDP per 
capita in the United States would not maintain continuous 
growth, and the productivity growth brought by 
technological progress might have a gradual slowing trend.  
As more and more robots are brought into production 
for the sake of productivity increments and cost savings, 
economists start to focus on the positive impacts of robots 
on economic growth in a natural way. As for theoretical 
models, Fernald and Jones [19] argue that education and 
R&D investments are the two main drivers for the US 
economic growth during the past decades, but with the 
gradual weakening of these drivers, the economic growth 
is likely to slow down. However, the use of AI and robots 
raises fundamental uncertainties about future growth: AI 
will increase the chance that machines will replace workers 
to some extent, and thus may lead to higher growth in the 
future. Even, in some cases, if capital can completely 
replace Labor, growth rates could skyrocket. Prettner’s [7] 
theoretical model extends the Solow model [20] and further 
explains this phenomenon. The production factors can be 
divided into three categories, human capital, traditional 
capital, and automatic capital (e.g., robots, 3D printers, and 
driverless cars, etc.). His production function is established 
on the assumption that labor and automated capital are 
completely substituted for the other. He shows that 
technological progress and the emergence of robots can 
indeed promote the development of the economy. If 
automated capital can completely replace the labor force, 
the economy can achieve permanent growth even without 
technological progress. In terms of empirical research, 
Kromann et al. [1] use panel data of robot inventories of 9 
industries in 10 countries from the IFR database and EU 
KLEMS database, showing that the application of 
industrial robots has a significant positive effect on labor 
productivity. Acemoglu and Restrepo [21] studied the 
relationship between the aging problem, economic growth, 
and robot investment. The aging problems will hurt 
economic growth. One of the main reasons is the low labor 
force participation rate and lower productivity of older 
workers [22]. The second reason is that aging will lead to 
more savings than expected investment, leading to long-
term stagnation [23, 24]. However, Acemoglu and 
Restrepo [21] proved that there was no such negative 
correlation in the empirical study. In the countries 
experiencing a faster-aging problem, automation is being 
adopted faster and industrial robots are more densely used. 
Graetz and Micheals [3] also employ datasets of IFR and 
EU KLEMS to conclude that the use of industrial robots 
improves labor productivity and total factor productivity. 
The above theoretical research justifies that robots will 
have a positive impact on growth issues, and empirical 
research also confirms that the use of robots will promote 
labor productivity. But some studies suggest an opposite 
point of view. Gasteiger and Prettner [10] apply the 
Diamond model [25] as a benchmark, assuming that 
household savings come entirely from labor income. 
However, the competition between robots and the labor 
force reduces the wage rate, thus reducing labor force 
income, thereby reducing household savings and 
investment, and hindering economic growth. Sachs and 
Kotlikoff [8] believe that intelligent robots and young 
unskilled labor force are in a mutually substitutive relation, 
while old skilled labor forces are complements to robots. 
Falling wages of young labor forces reduce their ability to 
save and limit their investments in acquiring skills and 
capital. Benzell et al. [11] express the smart machine as a 
combination of capital and code and divided people in the 
labor market into high-tech and low-tech ones. Among 
them, high-tech labor force can produce codes. He 
demonstrates that the participation of robots will reduce the 
wages of labor in the long run. In such a case, higher gross 
demand in the future cannot be satisfied by a lower 
aggregated demand since the emergence of robots exploits 
a part of the income of consumers. 
Although prior literature discusses the impacts of the 
robot on the labor market and economic development, most 
of them simply regard the robots as a substitute during the 
production process. Most of these studies have not 
considered the characteristics of robots in their model. In 
the future, if AI technology reaches and exceeds the normal 
level of human intelligence, a series of very different 
considerations will occur [26]. Based on the current 
development prospect of AI, some optimistic scientists 
believe that AI will surpass human intelligence in 2029 
[27]. Some neutral scientists believe that there is a 90% 
probability that AI will reach the level of general human 
intelligence in this century [28]. In the coming decades, 
based on the development of information technology and 
machine learning technology, robots will master all human 
knowledge and skills, even including the ability to 
recognize patterns and solve problems, and its self-learning 
ability will probably surpass that of humans after the 
application of machine learning technology. Given these 
predictions, we have to think about and discuss the impact 
of general AI on humans. Therefore, based on such a 
prediction, this paper builds up an economic growth model 
that takes robot machine learning ability into account. 
 
3 THEORETICAL MODEL 
3.1 Model Preliminaries 
 
Our theoretical model considers two main 
characteristics of robots in the production process. The first 
one is the replacement role of robots in the labor force. The 
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second one is the machine learning ability of robots that is 
distinct from the human workforce. In this paper, we 
establish an economic growth model considering these two 
characteristics of robots. Before introducing the details of 
our model, we introduce the model of Prettener [7] as a 
benchmark. 
At present, many studies on the basic idea of robots 
entering the production process are based on the idea that 
robots are substitutes for human labor forces [7, 29, 30]. 
For instance, Prettener [7], as an extension of Solow’s 
growth model, assumes that the production factors in the 
production process are divided into three categories: labor 
force, robot, and capital. In his model, the production 
function takes the form of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function as follows: 
 
1( ) ,t t t t tY A L R K
α α−= +                                                    (1) 
 
The notations applied in our model are shown in Table 
A in Appendix A. In addition, Prettener [7] assumes that 
the labor force grows at a rate of n, and the traditional 
capital and robots can be accumulated, assuming that the 
depreciation rate is the same, both are δ. In this production 
function, labor and capital are incomplete substitutes, 
while labor and robot are complete substitutes. 
In Prettener's model, technological progress At is 
assumed to be completely exogenous. In that case, the 
impacts of technological progress and efficiency 
improvement caused by machine learning ability and 
experience accumulation of robots are not considered. In 
our model, the above model is extended with other 
assumptions unchanged. The output function in our model 
is shown in Eq. (2): 
 
( ) 1 ,t Rt t Lt t tY A R A L K
α α−= +                                           (2) 
 
The notations applied in our model are shown in Table 
A in Appendix A. In this paper, we assume that the robot 
has the ability of machine learning. With the accumulation 
of knowledge and capital, the robot's work efficiency will 
increase significantly. Based on the idea of "Learning by 
doing" of endogenous growth theory [31, 32], ARt is 
expressed in the following form: 
 
,  0,  0.Rt tA BK B
θ θ= > >                                              (3) 
 
Besides, we assume that the speed of robots’ machine 
learning is much faster than that of labor force. In that case, 
ALt is expressed as 
 
, 0, 0.Lt tA CK C
λ θ λ= > > >                                        (4) 
 
θ > λ indicates that the robot is better at learning than 
the labor force. Thus, the resulting output function in our 
model is 
 
( ) 1 .t t t t t tY BK R CK L Kαθ λ α−= +                                     (5) 
The notations applied in our model are shown in Table 
A in Appendix A. 
3.2  Comparative Statics Analysis and Long-term 
Equilibrium 
 
In perfect competition, we can obtain the return of the 
robot Rtw , the wage of the labor force 
L
tw , and the return 
of traditional capital  Ktw  as follows: 
 
( ) 11 .R tt t t t t t
t
Y
w BK BK R CK L
R
αα θ θ λα
−− +∂= = +
∂
               (6) 
( ) 11 .L tt t t t t t
t
Y
w CK BK R CK L
L
αα λ θ λα
−− +∂= = +
∂
                (7) 
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= = − + +
∂
+ + +
  (8) 
 
Based on the above analysis, we have Proposition 1 
and Proposition 2 as follows. 
Proposition 1. With other parameters unchanged, the 
output is increasingly concave in the inputs of robots. 
Proof of Proposition 1 is shown in Appendix B. 
It is intuitive that as the input of robots increases, total 
output will increase. However, the robot’s marginal output 
is diminishing. Therefore, there exists an optimal robot 
investment level in the production process.  More robots 
are not always better. We can find the detailed analysis in 
Section 4.  
Proposition 2. The return gap between robots and 
labor depends on the learning ability of robots and labor. 
More specifically, (1) when the learning ability of the robot 
is stronger than that of labor, the return gap between robot 
and labor increases as the capital inputs increase. (2) When 
the learning ability of the labor force is stronger than that 
of the robot, the return gap between the robot and the labor 
force decreases as the capital inputs increase. 
Proof of Proposition 2 is shown in Appendix B. 
We believe that in the future, based on the 
development of information technology and machine 
learning technology, robots will master all human 
knowledge and skills, even including the ability to 
recognize patterns and solve problems, and its self-learning 
ability will probably surpass that of humans after the 
application of machine learning technology. Therefore, in 
our paper we will focus on the case when θ − λ > 0 holds. 
Next, we derive the long-term equilibrium of our 
model. The change rate of traditional capital tK  and robot 
tR  is shown as follows: 
( )( ) 1 .1 r tt t t t t ts s BK R CK L K KK αθ λ α δ−= − + −                  (9) 
( ) 1 .r t t t t t tt ss BK R CK L RR Kαθ λ α δ−= + −                      (10) 
Therefore, the growth rate of capital gK and robot gR 
can be written as 
( )1 .t t t t tK r
t t






≡ = − −  
 

           (11) 
( ) 1
.
t t t t tt
R r
t t








           (12) 
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By simplifying the overall growth rate into the form of 
per capita, we obtain the growth rate of capital gk and 
robots gk in terms of per capita as 
 
( ) 1 .t t t t t tk r
t t
k L r Bk CL k
g s s n
k k
αθ θ λ λ
δ
 +
≡ = − − −  
 

   (13) 
1
 .t t t t t t tk r
t t t
r L r Bk CL k k
g ss n
r r r
α αθ θ λ λ
δ
−   +





Where lowercase letters refer to variables in terms of 
the per worker units. In the Appendix C we show that the 
following dynamic system fully characterizes the evolution 
of the economy.  
 
( )1 .g n k rkg n g gδ αθ α θ α+ + = + − +                             (15) 
( ) ( )1 1 ,g n k rrg n g gδ αθ αθ α α+ + = + − + − −               (16) 
 
where g nkg δ+ + is the growth rate of (gk + δ + n) and
g nrg δ+ +  is the growth rate of (gr + δ + n). 
Next, we investigate the evolutions of kt and rt by 
illustrating the long-term equilibrium with phase diagrams. 
We first examine the dynamics of kt. We then investigate 
the evolution of rt. 
(1) The dynamics of kt. 
Since ( ) 1g n r kkg n g gδ α θ θ+ +  = + − −  , we divide 
the discussion into three parts depending on the relation 














 0,g nkg δ+ + =  then 















 0,gkg <  gk 
decreases. 
As shown in Fig. 1, when θ > λ > 0, the slope of the 
solid line is greater than 1. Thus, the corresponding phase 
diagram is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 1 Change in the growth rate of capital per capita 
(2) The dynamics of rt. 
Since ( ) ( ) ,1 1g n k rrg n g gδ αθ αθ α α+ + = + − + − −  
we divide the discussion into three parts depending on the 
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−
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αθ α αθ α
−
= − +
− + − +




αθ α αθ α
−
> − +
− + − +




αθ α αθ α
−
< − +
− + − +
0,grg <  gr increases. 
The phase diagram is shown in Fig. 2 as follows: 
 
 
Figure 2 Change in the growth rate of robots per capita 
 
When θ > λ > 0 , we obtain Fig. 3 below by combining 
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. 
 
 
Figure 3 Changes in the growth rate of robots and capital per capita 
 
From the above analysis and Fig. 3, we have 
Proposition 3.  
Proposition 3. When the learning ability of robots is 
stronger than human capital, there will be no balanced 
growth path for the economy, and the economy will 
eventually show a sustained growth pattern, and the growth 
rate of capital per capita, output per capita and robot per 
capita will keep growing.  
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When we consider the strong machine learning ability 
of robots, the growth rate of traditional capital and robot 
per capita is greater than zero, that is to say, the growth rate 
of capital, output, and robot per capita keeps increasing.  
  
4 NUMERICAL STUDY 
 
To illustrate the theoretical analysis more intuitively, 
we employ a numerical study in this section. We first 
conduct a comparative analysis of the machine learning 
capability of robots. Then we illustrate the long-term 
economic growth rate with different learning abilities of 
robots and different percentages of total savings invested 
in robots. We start from the comparative analysis. Tab. 1 
shows the parameter values of the comparative analysis. 
 
Table 1 The values of parameter for the comparative analysis 
 n s α δ sr θ λ B C t 
Dotted 
line 0.005 0.48 0.7 0.04 0.1 0.02 0 1 1 200 
Solid 
Line 0.005 0.48 0.7 0.04 0.1 / / / / 200 
 
 
                                                a)                                                                                       b)                                                                                      c) 
Figure 4 a) The growth rate of capital per capita; b) The growth rate of robot per capita; c) The growth rate of output per capita 
 
In Fig. 4(a-c), the dotted line shows the numerical 
results when the robot’s learning ability is stronger than 
that of the human labor force. The solid line shows the 
results when the robot has no machine learning ability. By 
comparing these figures, we can conclude that when the 
robots have no machine learning ability, the growth rate of 
output per person tends to be constant. The growth rate of 
output per person will continue to increase when robots 
have machine learning capabilities that are stronger than 
the average human labor force. 
Then we illustrate the relationship between robot 
learning ability and per capita output growth rate in Fig. 5 
and the relationship between percentage of total savings 
invested in robots and per capita output growth rate in Fig. 
6. The parameter values are shown in Tab. 2. 
 
Table 2 Parameter values of machine learning growth model 
 n s α δ sr θ λ B C t 
Fig. 5 0.005 0.48 0.7 0.04 0.1 / 0 1 1 200 
Fig. 6 0.005 0.48 0.7 0.04 / 0.01 0 1 1 200 
 
Fig. 5 shows the relationship between robot machine 
learning ability and per capita output growth rate: 
 
 
Figure 5 The relationship between robot learning ability and per capita output  
growth rate 
 
From Fig. 5, we have the following proposition.  
Proposition 4. The robot learning ability and per 
capita output growth rate are positively related. 
With the rapid development of AI technology, we 
believe that the learning ability of robots will increase in 
the long run. Besides, the research and development 
investment for improving robot learning ability is of great 
importance. 
Fig. 6 shows the relationship between percentage of 




Figure 6 The relationship between percentage of total savings invested in 
robots and per capita output growth rate 
 
From Fig. 6, we have Proposition 5 as follows.  
Proposition 5. There is an optimal robot investment 
ratio to maximize the long-term growth rate of output per 
capita. 
More robots are not always better. Combined with the 
findings in Proposition 5, we should not only focus on 
increasing the amount of robot investment, and we should 
also focus on the quality and learning ability of robots. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
We consider robot as a unique factor of production, not 
only considering its substitution effect on labor force, but 
also considering its essential difference from labor force 
and traditional capital in the production process. We 
believe that the difference mainly comes from the 
application of AI technology to the robot, so that it has the 
ability of machine learning, and this ability may surpass 
human labor force in the near future. Thus, the robot can 
accumulate experience and work efficiency in the work. 
We take the aforementioned essential difference of robots 
into our theoretical model. Based on the endogenous 
growth model with the idea of "learning by doing", this 
paper analyzes the impact of the use of robots on long-term 
economic growth. Our results show that (1) With other 
parameters unchanged, the output is increasingly concave 
in the inputs of robots; (2) The return gap between robots 
and labor depends on the learning ability of robots and 
labor; (3) When the learning ability of robots is stronger 
than human capital, there will be no balanced growth path 
for the economy, and the economy will eventually show a 
sustained growth pattern, and the growth rate of capital per 
capita, output per capita and robot per capita will keep 
growing; (4) The robot learning ability and per capita 
output growth rate are positively related; (5)There is an 
optimal robot investment ratio to maximize the long-term 
growth rate of output per capita. 
AI technology and the rapid development of robot 
technology have brought new power in various fields. As 
for the developed countries, the application of robots 
provides favorable conditions for them to carry out 
"reindustrialization", reshape the national manufacturing 
competitiveness and develop emerging industries. It also 
brings new opportunities and challenges for emerging 
developing countries to maintain their competitive 
advantages in manufacturing, upgrade their industrial 
structure and optimize their employment structure. In our 
paper, we conclude that the application of the robot may 
boost the economy to some extent. However, more robots 
are not always better. Combined with Proposition 5, 
managers should not only increase investments in robots. 
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Lt The amount of labor at time t 
Rt The amount of robots at time t 
Kt The amount of traditional capital at time t 
Yt The amount of total output at time t 
α The share of output in the robot and labor sectors,  0 < α < 1 
ARt Working efficiency of robots 
ALt Working efficiency of labor 
B Parameter that describes the learning ability (efficiency) of robots 
C Parameter that describes the learning ability (efficiency) of labor 
θ Parameter that describes the learning ability (efficiency) of robots 
λ Parameter that describes the learning ability (efficiency) of labor 
s Saving rate 
sr The percentage of total savings invested in robots 
n The growth rate of the labor force 




Proof of Proposition 1. 
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since 0 < α < 1. Proven. 
 






θ λ−=                                                            (B-3) 
 
When robots are better at learning than the workforces, 
i.e., θ – λ > 0, wR/wL ≥ 0. When the workforce is better at 




Derivations of the long-run accumulation rate of 
robots, using Eq. (16) and (17), we have: 
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Then we have: 
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Then we have: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ln




t t t t
g n
s s L k
BL r k C k
λ λ





= + − + +
+ + −
                     (C-5) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ln ln ln ln
ln ln
1 ln 1 ln .
r r t t
t t t t
t t
g n s s L k
BL r k C r
k r
λ λ





+ + = + + +
+ + − +
+ − − −
             (C-
6) 
 
The growth rate of (gk + δ + n): 
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Because θ > λ, at the long-run equilibrium,
( ) ( ) t t t CBL r k
θ λ θ λ− −
 . 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t




BL k BL k
BL r k C BL r k
B L k k r B L k k r
BL r k C BL r k
B L k L r B L k L r
B
r
L r k C BL r
r
k
θ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ
θ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ
θ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ
θ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ
θ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ
θ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ
θ λ θ λ
θ λ θ λ
− − − −
− − − −
− − − − − −
− − − −
− − − − − −
































n n g g
k
δ αθ αλ α α θ λ
α θ λ α αθ α θ α
+ + = + + + − +
+ − − = + − +
  

        (C-9) 
 
The growth rate of (gr + δ + n): 
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Because θ > λ, at the long-run equilibrium,
( ) ( ) t t t CBL r k
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